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Abstract 
OECD data are used to investigate public and private environmental expenditures and, although 
they are more complete and consistent than other datasets, they are still poor. This is important in 
the context of measuring the benefits of environmental protection, when little is really known about 
its actual costs. Despite these limitations, this study demonstrates that there has been no shift 
towards an increasing private sector burden relative to the public sector over time. The paper also 
finds little evidence to show that environmental expenditures negatively impact on economic 
growth, although there is inconsistency between the ‘no effects’ finding of the competitiveness 
literature and the ‘negative effects’ finding of most of the productivity literature. Finally, the 
elasticity of expenditure with respect to income is found to be 1.2, lower than would be expected if 
the ‘environmental demand effect’ is significant in explaining the downward slope of the 
environmental Kuznets curve. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC SPENDING 
The increase in public spending in advanced economies has been well 
documented (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; Maddison, 1984, 1991 and 1995; 
Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). Traditionally, interest in public spending has been 
driven by the debate about the relative merits of the role of the state in the 
modern economy. Crudely put, those who favour less intervention call for less 
public spending, and those who favour more intervention call for more spending. 
In turn, the degree of intervention is thought to be linked to the driving forces of 
economic growth and, by implication, the prospects for increasing per capita 
human well-being. Few now argue,
1 as they might have done in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century, that the bigger the share of GNP absorbed by government 
spending, the better the prospects for growth or, if not growth, the better the 
prospect for social well-being.  
Public expenditure growth has, of course, been dominated by the major 
components of state provision: pensions, social security, education and health. In 
this paper, we focus on a neglected element of expenditure, environmental 
protection. Environmental protection appears to be a classic case of a public 
good: expenditure generates improvements that benefit large numbers of people 
simultaneously (joint consumption) and there are few prospects for exclusion.
2 
The jurisdiction of the publicness also varies: measures to control local air 
pollution, for example, will have local public good characteristics. Measures to 
control transboundary air pollution (usually, acidifying and eutrophying 
emissions such as sulphur and nitrogen) will have regional jurisdictions. 
Measures to control global pollutants such as carbon dioxide have global 
jurisdictions. Traditional public finance theory suggests that public goods will be 
underprovided in a market-oriented economy. Hence there is a clear role for the 
state in providing those goods. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) note some of the 
more recent reactions to this popular economic notion of state provision. Few 
believe any longer that governments are altruistic social welfare maximisers. 
Forms of government control are often found to be inefficient as public good 
providers. Public expenditure cannot be reversed as easily as it can be expanded, 
and the instruments ostensibly under the control of government are not in fact in 
their full control, nor is there full understanding of the effects of policy choices. 
The move away from the presumption that state provision is best suggests that 
there should be more private provision of public goods. In terms of 
                                                                                                                                    
1For an exception, see Ng (2001), who argues that economists’ efforts to estimate the marginal social cost of 
public spending are flawed. Attention has been focused on the ‘true’ cost of taxation, deadweight losses adding 
considerably to the cost of raising revenue, but little attention has been paid to any offsetting gains on the 
spending side. Once the focus shifts to what makes people happy, as opposed to income- or consumption-based 
surrogates for utility, public spending may secure net gains in happiness.  
2The exceptions generally relate to land- or water-based assets — for example, nature reserves. Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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environmental expenditures, we would expect to see some shift away from the 
public provision of environmental goods to their private provision.  
The first issue to be investigated, then, is the public/private mix of 
environmental protection expenditure.  Environmental policy has always been 
characterised by substantial private expenditures, simply because of the nature of 
the regulations — for example, standard-setting. But there has been an attempt to 
shift the burdens of protection further away from the public purse to the private 
sector, usually by experimenting with new forms of regulation that involve self-
regulation by corporations. Additionally, trends towards privatisation of utilities 
such as water and energy should result in significant reclassification of public 
expenditures as private expenditures. Unfortunately, as we shall see, this is not a 
trend that can be discerned from the published data. In general, the quality of the 
recorded data on environmental expenditures is extremely bad and this permits 
only limited policy analysis to be carried out.  
A second policy issue that has been much debated in the environmental 
economics literature is the extent to which environmental policy has been a 
‘drag’ on economic growth and competitiveness. The focus here has generally 
not been on the public spending aspect of environmental control — which could 
conceivably affect competitiveness through the crowding-out of private 
investment — so much as on the burdens borne by the private sector through 
environmental standard-setting. We therefore review the extent to which the 
evidence supports the regulatory burden hypothesis.  
Third, we investigate the hypothesis of an ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ 
(EKC) for environmental protection expenditures. The EKC hypothesis suggests 
that economies at an early stage of economic transition tend to deteriorate their 
environments. After some point, however, environmental quality increases. Part 
of this change is due to structural transformations within the economy (for 
example, from heavy industry to light industry or from dirty to clean fuels — 
both of which have an effect in terms of reducing environmental expenditures 
compared with the counterfactual situation in which these transformations do not 
occur). But, in most explanations of the EKC, part of the downward turn is also 
thought to be due to the demand for environmental quality growing as per capita 
income rises. The literature has extensively investigated the relationship between 
per capita income and various pollutants, but there has been a general neglect of 
environmental protection expenditures and their relationship to income. On the 
other hand, there is a modest political economy literature that asks why 
environmental concerns are apparently stronger in some countries than in others. 
Hence we can ask what the links are between environmental expenditures and 
potential determining factors. 
Overall, then, the paper sets out to investigate three issues: 
•  the relationship between public and private protective expenditures; Fiscal Studies 
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•  the evidence for or against ‘regulatory drag’ due to environmental 
expenditures; 
•  the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis and the determinants of 
environmental demand. 
Before turning to these issues, it is important to set out what we know about 
environmental expenditures. 
II. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE GROWTH 
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the level of overall public expenditure, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, in selected countries. One immediate 
observation is that the estimates for some years vary according to source. Those 
where the disparity is more than five percentage points are shown in bold. 
Second, the picture is one of continuous growth of the public sector, but there is 
a suggestion that this has levelled off in Italy and the USA, and possibly in the 
UK. 
TABLE 1 
Government Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 
Per cent 
  1880 1913 1938 1950 1973  1990–92  1996 
France — M  11.2  8.9 23.2 27.6 38.8 51.0  — 
France — T  12.6  17.0 29.0  — —  49.8  55.0 
Germany — M  10.0  17.7  42.4  30.4 42.0 46.1  — 
Germany — T  10.0  14.8  34.1  — —  45.1  49.1 
Italy — T  13.7  17.1  31.1  —  —  53.4  52.7 
Sweden — T  5.7  10.4  16.5  —  —  59.1  64.2 
Switzerland — T  16.5  14.0  24.1  —  —  33.5  39.4 
UK  —  M  9.9 13.3 28.8 34.2 41.5 51.2  — 
UK — T  9.4  12.7  30.0  —  —  39.9  43.0 
Japan — M  9.0  14.2  30.3 19.8 22.9 33.5  — 
Japan — T  8.8  8.3  25.4 —  — 31.3 35.9 
USA — M  —  8.0  19.8  —  —  38.5  — 
USA — T  7.3  7.5  19.7  —  —  32.8  32.4 
Note: Figures shown in bold are those where the disparity between sources is more than five percentage points. 
Source: M = Maddison (1995); T = Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000). 
 
III. THE GROWTH IN ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURE 
Little is known about environmental expenditures before 1970. Expenditures 
may be made by government (central and local) and by regulated agents, mainly Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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corporations. The private component tends to reflect the expenditures that arise 
because of regulations, especially regulations that establish environmental 
standards. Depending on the country, standards may be set on the basis of 
allowable emissions, ambient concentrations of pollutants in the receiving 
environment or permitted technology. Technology-based standards are very 
common and usually centre on the notion of ‘best available technology’ (BAT) 
or some variant of this (Pearce, 2000). ‘Best’ here refers to technology that is 
regarded as suitable in terms of its environmental performance. Clearly, 
determining what expenditure borne by the private sector is due to the standard 
is complex. Strictly, it would be the difference in cost between the BAT and the 
technology that otherwise would have been adopted. Such cost differences are 
hard to estimate without knowledge of the counterfactual technology. Added 
complications are that there will be differential running costs and potential 
effects on output. In practice, very crude estimates of technology costs are used 
to estimate actual expenditures. 
One main source of broadly comparable expenditures is the OECD, which 
has collected ‘pollution abatement and control expenditures’ (PAC) data since 
the 1980s.
3 PAC expenditures are defined as ‘the flow of investment and current 
expenditure that is directly aimed at pollution abatement and control, and which 
is incurred by the public sector, the business sector and private households’ 
(OECD, 1993). Coverage is mainly related to water pollution control, air 
pollution control and waste management. Waste and water dominate the 
expenditure statistics. Excluded from PAC data are any expenditures on, for 
example, national parks, nature reserves, exploitation of natural resources and 
workplace protection. The OECD makes an attempt to determine which 
expenditures are ‘directly aimed’ at PAC, rather than counting all expenditures 
that may have some environmental benefit (for example, energy efficiency 
expenditures that yield positive rates of return to the household or corporation). 
Of necessity, making this kind of distinction gives rise to further uncertainties in 
the database. The OECD also makes an effort to avoid double counting — for 
example, some abatement may be subsidised and it is important to determine 
whether this subsidy appears as a central government expenditure or as a private 
sector expenditure on the subsidised equipment. 
Appendix A sets out the available OECD data. Figures 1a–1c summarise the 
data in graphical form for absolute levels of expenditure in constant prices. 
Figures 2a–2c summarise the data expressed in per capita terms — an attempt to 
normalise the data. It has to be stressed that the data are uncertain and even the 
OECD’s own estimates change over time. We have taken the latest available 
summary data (OECD, 1999), which are expressed in terms of percentage of  
 
                                                                                                                                    
3PAC monographs were published in 1990, 1993 and 1996 (OECD, 1990, 1993 and 1996) but data appear to 
have been collected before 1990 and after 1996.  Fiscal Studies 
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FIGURE 1c 
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FIGURE 2b 
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GDP. To arrive at per capita absolute expenditures in real terms, we have 
multiplied the percentage of GDP data by the OECD’s own estimates of GDP 
and divided by the OECD estimates of country populations. Per capita data and 
absolute estimates are presented: the former make some allowance for the fact 
that some expenditures will be population-related, the latter acknowledge the 
public good element of environmental expenditures. The issue of the reliability 
of the data is addressed below. 
TABLE 2a 
Breakdown of Environmental Expenditures: Selected OECD Countries 
US dollars, circa 1990 
Expenditure per capita  Country: sector 
Public Corporations  Households 
USA: water  97  51  n.a. 
USA: waste  51  88  n.a. 
USA: air  4  69  31 
USA: total  152  208  31+ 
      
UK: water  11  81  n.a. 
UK: waste  33  38  11 
UK: air  13  30  1 
UK total  57  149  12+ 
      
France: water  86  24  11 
France: waste  63  22  4 
France: air  n.a.  20  3 
France: total  149+  66  18 
      
Netherlands: water  92 48  n.a. 
Netherlands: waste  77 18  n.a. 
Netherlands: air  3 45  18 
Netherlands: total  172  111  18+ 
Source: OECD, 1996. 
 
TABLE 2b 
Percentage Breakdown of Distributional Burden of Environmental Expenditures 
  Public Corporations  Households 
USA 39%  53%  8% 
UK 26%  68%  6% 
France 64%  28%  8% 
Netherlands 57%  37% 6% 
Source: Table 2a. 
 Fiscal Studies 
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The OECD data are largely confined to water pollution control, air pollution 
control and waste management.
4 Table 2 gives approximate orders of magnitude 
for the sectoral breakdown of expenditures for selected OECD countries. Some 
patterns are discernible. First, the household sector typically bears a small cost 
burden relative to the corporate and government sectors, ignoring, of course, the 
role of household taxation in financing government expenditure. The US 
household sector bears a much higher burden than that in the European countries 
shown, due to the US procedure of allocating vehicle emission abatement to 
vehicle purchasers, i.e. including households. Otherwise, household burdens 
appear fairly consistent across the different countries. 
Second, corporate expenditures are higher in the USA and the UK, but lower 
in the Netherlands and France. The OECD offers no clues as to why this is the 
case. 
Third, the US expenditures total around $400 per capita, the Netherlands 
totals around $300 per capita, and France and the UK total around $200 per 
capita each. Arguably, this pattern reflects popular perceptions of the relative 
strengths of environmental concern in the different countries, an issue to which 
we return. 
Fourth, there are some environmental sectoral rankings. Water pollution is 
ranked first in terms of public expenditure in three of the four countries, and 
again (just) for three of the four countries in terms of corporate expenditure. 
Waste tends to be the next most important category, with the exception of the 
Dutch corporate burden.  
European Union data are assembled by EUROSTAT
5 for the period 1988 to 
1996. Prior to 1988, some estimates are available in ERECO (1993). Appendix B 
summarises the relevant information. Unfortunately, the quality of the 
EUROSTAT data is very poor, and the database has not been used in what 
follows.
6 We have also investigated UK data, and Appendix C summarises what 
is known about that information. UK estimates of environmental expenditure 
exist for only a few years and are biased towards expenditure by the corporate 
sector. Only one attempt appears to have been made to collect estimates for 
overall levels of expenditure beyond pollution abatement and embracing all 
sectors (UK Department of the Environment, 1992). Again, therefore, we make 
use of these data only to the extent that they help illuminate issues arising as we 
proceed.
7 
                                                                                                                                    
4The figures for the UK (Figures 1c and 2c) show a marked downturn in environmental expenditure in the 
1990s. We consider this to be the result of a misprint in the original OECD documents: 0.3 per cent of GDP 
should read 1.3 per cent. We have not changed the figure here. 
5At www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat. 
6Not only are the data poor, but the presentation of the data is poor: columns in tables are mislabelled, no 
indication is given as to whether estimates are in current or constant prices, and terminology is not explained. 
EUROSTAT’s website simply adds to the confusion.  
7Data on environmental expenditure in developing countries are sparse — see Appendix D. Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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IV. HOW RELIABLE ARE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURE DATA? 
One reason for the comparative absence of econometric exercises involving 
environmental expenditures could be that analysts have judged the data to be 
unreliable. There appear to be no exercises testing for data reliability outside of 
the USA. The US studies are enabled by the collection of reasonably consistent 
and regular data using the PACE system (pollution abatement and control 
expenditures) by the US Census Bureau. The US studies relate only to private, 
corporate expenditures and produce ambiguous answers. Joshi, Krishnan and 
Lave (2000) suggest that environmental expenditures in the US steel industry are 
grossly  underestimated by a factor of around 10. On the other hand, 
Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (1997 and 2000) suggest that, for a wide range of 
manufacturing industries, reported costs are overestimates of true costs.  
The obvious starting point for an analysis is to compare the ‘correct’ notion 
of cost with what is reported in the statistics. What get reported tend to be 
expenditures that industry regards as being due to environmental legislation. But 
these can obviously differ from true economic costs for various reasons. 
Economic cost would be measured by the change in the combined sum of 
producers’ and consumers’ surplus. Any lost consumer surplus element is 
obviously omitted by industrial reporting. Changes in producers’ surplus may 
also be problematic. If the expenditure takes the form of capital equipment, there 
may be some negative effect on other capital investments. Public capital 
expenditure could crowd out private investment generally, and private 
environmental expenditure could compete for limited capital funds at the 
corporate level. Hence some analysts regard the true cost of environmental 
expenditure as involving forgone long-run profitability and economic growth due 
to these crowding-out effects. There may also be ‘new source bias’ whereby 
mandated standards relate to new plant but perversely exempt old plant, 
discouraging investment in new, more efficient technology. Conventional 
operational costs may also rise due to the impact of the abatement measure on 
operating efficiency (for example, sulphur emission controls may lower energy 
conversion efficiency). Clearly, there are a fair number of ways in which 
environmental expenditures may have negative impacts on cost structures. This 
has been the presumption in the literature that tries to assess ‘true’ control costs, 
and has also been instrumental in the literature on the relationship between 
environmental policy and economic growth and productivity.  
There are reasons for supposing that there may be offsetting factors that 
lower rather than raise costs. First, mandated expenditures may raise awareness 
within the corporation about ways of saving costs on energy and materials. This 
is more likely to be the case when regulations permit process changes rather than 
add-on abatement equipment (Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih, 1997 and 2000). 
Potentially more significant, and emphasised in the literature on corporate 
environmental management, is the complementarity between profit and Fiscal Studies 
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environmental expenditure in contexts where firms are not operating on the 
production possibility frontier. The most famous example of this view is 
attributed to Porter (1990 and 1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995a and 
1995b). The ‘Porter hypothesis’ is not clear-cut, but is generally taken to imply 
that firms are not operating at full efficiency and that some form of regulation 
acts as a catalyst that makes firms realise more productive potential through 
resource efficiency. This is the familiar ‘win–win’ argument in the corporate 
environmental literature. The corporate environmental accounting literature has 
tended to suggest some balance of effects, i.e. a proper reporting of the wider 
costs and the offsetting gains that may accrue (Schaltegger and Burritt, 2000). 
Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (1997 and 2000) estimate translog cost functions 
(Heathfield and Wibe, 1987) for selected US manufacturing industries based on 
800 separate plants. Inputs include capital, labour, energy, materials and 
environmental abatement effort. Abatement effort is assumed to be fixed in the 
sense that expenditures are determined exogenously by regulation, and output is 
also assumed to be fixed, i.e. varying output in response to environmental 
regulation is not an option. The full effects of regulation should then show up in 
raised costs. Morgenstern et al. stress the need to allow for differences in 
productivity between plants — differences that, in their view, are unlikely to be 
caused by environmental regulations (inter-plant variation is affected by factors 
such as location). Hence they opt for models that involve not pooling the data 
but separately estimating within-plant effects. They find that pooled effects 
produce larger estimates of regulatory impacts on costs, whereas the expectation 
should be that the longer-run effects would be smaller. The authors focus on the 









where  C is cost, R is regulatory expenditure, X  is a vector of log output, 
regulatory expenditure and input prices, and α  and β  are the parameters to be 
estimated. 
Based on Morgenstern et al.’s fixed-effects model (i.e. the non-pooled data), 
the results suggest that the industry average effect of a dollar of regulatory 
expenditure is to raise costs by just $0.13, i.e. there are $0.87 of offsetting gains. 
For steel, there is a net increase in costs of $1.16, but this is far lower than the 
effect found in other studies — for example, Joshi, Krishnan and Lave (2000). 
For plastics, there are net reductions in costs — a $4 saving — i.e. something 
like the Porter hypothesis is at work on this industry. For petroleum, 
environmental expenditures are fairly neutral, i.e. each dollar of regulatory 
expenditure is associated with an offsetting dollar of savings. Finally, for pulp 
and paper, the additional cost is $0.82. Note, however, that Morgenstern et al.’s  
 Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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TABLE 3 
Marginal Industrial Costs of Environmental Expenditures (USA):  
Effect on Cost of $1 of Extra Expenditure 
Study Paper  Plastics  Oil  Steel  Average 
Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih, 1997 
— fixed effects 
















         
Gray and Shadbegian, 1995 
— fixed effects 














         
Joshi, Krishnan and Lave, 2000 










Notes: Figures are rounded. Morgenstern et al. and Joshi et al. adopt the translog cost function approach. Gray 
and Shadbegian use a growth accounting approach. 
 
random-effects model (pooled data) produces estimates more in line with the 
‘pessimistic’ view of regulatory controls. Table 3 reports the overall results and 
also shows the results from some of the other literature. 
To some extent, the issue reflects the judgemental issue of whether it is better 
to adopt the fixed-effects, within-plant model or the pooled, random-effects 
model. There is an additional choice between the growth accounting approach 
(in which output is allowed to vary) and the cost function approach. The cost 
function and growth accounting approaches produce different results, the latter 
being on the more pessimistic side than the former. But the cost function 
approach applied to one sector — steel — produces very different results on the 
basis of the random-effects model alone. If Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (1997 
and 2000) are right, there is a powerful defence for the view that regulation is 
‘good’ for costs rather than bad, although the precise mechanisms whereby 
regulation gets translated into cost reductions are not investigated. 
In terms of the analyses reported in this paper, we have no basis for judging 
whether the bias in estimation is systematic over time or over countries. Hence 
we have no option but to work with the data that are available. The necessary 
caveats are therefore in order. But there are other problems with the data. First, 
capital and recurrent expenditures are summed in the OECD database. Capital 
expenditures appear to be recorded in the year of their occurrence and are not 
annualised. This raises the potential for some years to show large expenditures 
which are not repeated in following years, depending on the nature of the 
relevant legislation. Second, what is recorded is pollution abatement 
expenditure, whereas environmental expenditure is larger in scope. It would, for 
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UK, pollution control expenditures constitute around 60 per cent of the total of 
environmental expenditures. Third, the focus in the OECD data is on government 
and corporations and it is unclear how far household expenditures are adequately 
covered. Appendix C looks at this issue in the context of UK data.  
V. IS THERE A SHIFT TO PRIVATE CONTROL EXPENDITURE? 
The first question we raised was the extent to which environmental public goods 
originally provided by the public sector were now provided by the private sector, 
albeit on an ‘involuntary’ basis through regulation. We hypothesised that this 
shift would occur because of the concerns in recent decades to reduce the size of 
public expenditure generally and to shift regulation towards ‘voluntary and 
negotiated agreements’ and because of privatisation. However, the OECD data 
do not readily support the idea that there has been a significant shift away from 
the public provision of environmental goods to their private provision. Table 4 
summarises the public/private mix of environmental protection expenditure 
between 1985 and 1997 for those OECD countries with data covering two or 
more years. Japan and Portugal have by far the lowest levels of private 
environmental expenditure as a proportion of total environmental expenditure. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, such as 
Poland and the Czech Republic, have the highest relative levels of private 
environmental expenditure. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, France, 
Germany,
8 the Netherlands and the USA all experienced declines in private 
environmental expenditure as a proportion of total environmental spending. 
Hence, during this period, public environmental expenditure increased at a faster 
rate than private expenditure, which suggests that the burden of environmental 
protection is not shifting away from the public to the private sector as expected. 
Equally, we are unable to say if this is a genuine trend, because of the poor 
quality of the data. 
VI. ARE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES A DRAG ON 
ECONOMIC GROWTH? 
A common argument that may help to mobilise lobbies against environmental 
expenditures is that they act as a ‘drag’ on industrial competitiveness and hence 
economic growth. The argument is potentially most powerful in the context of 
legislation that imposes costs on the private sector, but there is also a weaker link 
in terms of public expenditures as a means of ‘crowding out’ private investment 
and hence productivity.  
While it is not always clear what is meant by competitiveness, it has at least 
two components: ‘macro’-competitiveness (i.e. the competitiveness generally of 
                                                                                                                                    
8West Germany until 1991, and then Germany including the former East Germany. Fiscal Studies 
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any nation vis-à-vis other countries and trading blocs) and sectoral 
competitiveness (i.e. competition between sectors within a nation). Macro-
competitiveness is frequently invoked in discussions about environmental policy. 
However, it is not clear how this form of competitiveness can be damaged by 
environmental regulation so long as the relevant competition is between 
countries with flexible exchange rates. The effect of any cost changes in one 
country, even assuming they were significant, would feed through changes in 
exchange rates, not through loss of market share.  
There are several comprehensive surveys of the effects of environmental 
regulation generally on macro-competitiveness. Various tests of the proposition 
that environmental expenditures affect competitiveness negatively have been 
considered: 
•  the extent to which net exports of environmentally regulated goods change 
with regulations, or 
the extent to which net exports of environmentally regulated goods perform 
less well than those of less regulated goods; 
•  the extent to which firms facing heavy regulation locate outside the regulating 
country (the ‘pollution haven hypothesis’); 
•  the extent to which investment occurs away from strictly regulating countries; 
and 
•  the extent to which productivity is affected by regulation. 
Net exports have not been found to be significantly affected by regulations (Jaffe 
et al., 1995; Sorsa, 1994). Corporations’ location decisions are generally 
unaffected by environmental costs, primarily because they tend to be a small 
fraction of total costs (Jaffe et al., 1995; Eskeland and Harrison, 1997). There is 
no evidence that firms invest more abroad in pollution-intensive industries to 
compensate for higher environmental costs at home (Eskeland and Harrison, 
1997; World Bank, 1999).  
1. The ‘Porter Hypothesis’ 
The idea that regulation may improve competitiveness is associated with 
Michael Porter and the ‘Porter hypothesis’ (Porter, 1990a, 1990b and 1991; 
Porter and van der Linde, 1995a and 1995b). There is some doubt as to what the 
Porter hypothesis is meant to be. For example, it seems fairly clear that Porter 
does not think that any form of environmental regulation will induce cost 
reductions and competitiveness gains. Seemingly, only regulations that focus on 
prevention rather than amelioration or end-of-pipe technology will have this 
effect. Also there is the suggestion that the regulations should be market-based 
rather than in the traditional command-and-control mode. If so, then the 
hypothesis may not differ much from the traditional advocacy of most Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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environmental economists in favour of market-based instruments such as taxes 
and tradable quotas. 
What are the mechanisms through which the Porter hypothesis is supposed to 
operate? The general context is clearly intended to be bounded rationality: firms 
simply do not operate like neo-classical optimisers with perfect information. 
Accordingly, somehow illuminating an area where the ‘mental account’ of 
resource efficiency is located should induce some sort of ‘win–win’ solution 
whereby costs are reduced and environmental quality improved. Jaffe, Newell 
and Stavins (2000) suggest that Porter has five mechanisms in mind: (a) 
regulation forces attention to be paid to wastefulness; (b) regulation requires 
information to be generated and information has public good characteristics that 
mean it is likely to be undersupplied; (c) regulation reduces uncertainty about the 
returns that can be secured from innovations in environmental technology; (d) 
there is a first mover advantage in having high standards and responding to them, 
since other countries are likely to develop such standards later on; and (e) most 
generally, regulation creates a climate of thinking about innovation. As Jaffe et 
al. (2000) note, none of these mechanisms is uncontroversial. For example, 
regulation may create information but it is unclear if governments have better 
claims to know about the missing information than firms. (Indeed, most modern 
approaches resting on asymmetric information assume the opposite.) More to the 
point, adopting cost-reducing technologies does not necessarily mean that the 
adoption process has passed a cost–benefit test from the firm’s point of view. 
Finally, a point not made in the literature but that seems worth stating is that 
‘win–win’ theorems are undeniably popular and are not confined to this aspect 
of corporate behaviour. Win–win solutions may be illusory but politically 
attractive because they hold out the prospect of facing real and potentially 
painful trade-offs.  
One can imagine other mechanisms being at work that could provide indirect 
support for the Porter view. More regulation benefits firms manufacturing 
environmental compliance equipment. This is important because markets for 
pollution control technology and services are projected to rise well into the 
hundreds of billions of dollars in the next decade. Or it may be that firms finding 
it easy to comply with regulations squeeze out those that find it less easy to 
comply, increasing the market share of the lower-cost firms. Those who 
anticipate market changes — for example, to smaller more-fuel-efficient vehicles 
— might gain. There may be other benefits — as environmental concerns 
become ‘globalised’, so the green image of corporations is becoming 
internationally important. This raises the possibility that market share can be 
increased through environmental credentials, a benefit likely to accrue to first 
movers only, as Porter surmises. Similarly, environmental standards in the so-
called ‘lax environmental standard’ countries are in fact rising rapidly, which is 
one of the reasons why the pollution haven hypothesis is not fulfilled. Again, 
those making first moves in strict environmental compliance could secure export Fiscal Studies 
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market share because they are already locked into clean technology suitable for 
the expanding markets in comparison with their competitors. 
Overall, however, most economists have been very sceptical of the Porter 
hypothesis. If it were true, it would imply that corporations are very ignorant of 
the potential for cost reductions and that they require the stimulus of regulation 
to recognise such opportunities. This seems fairly unlikely (Jaffe et al., 1995; 
Oates, Palmer and Portney, 1994). Sorsa (1994) finds no evidence to suggest that 
rising standards improve competitiveness. Whereas Porter and van der Linde 
(1995a) cite case studies to support their propositions, Oates et al. survey the 
same corporations, and others, and find that they generally regarded the adopted 
clean technology as imposing a net cost on them, not a net benefit.
9 
2. Productivity Effects 
Most studies find that US productivity has been negatively affected by 
environmental regulation. The rate of growth of total factor productivity (i.e. 
output per unit of all inputs) has been lower in the USA than in other major 
countries such as Japan and Europe. Considerable efforts have therefore gone 
into trying to explain this comparatively poor performance. The comparatively 
strict environmental legislative regime in the USA has often been cited as a 
major, and sometimes the major, factor in explaining this difference. The issue 
can be addressed in three phases: 
•  Stage 1: Assess the evidence that conventionally measured output per unit 
input is adversely affected by environmental regulation as historically 
practised. 
•  Stage 2: Assess what the effect would have been had the environmental 
regulation taken a different form, especially through more widespread 
adoption of market-based approaches. The USA has made extensive use of 
strict command-and-control regulations combined with an excessively 
bureaucratic and litigious liability system (Stewart, 1993). The US experience 
of negative productivity effects may not therefore be generalisable. 
•  Stage 3: Assess whether the measure of productivity used in the literature is 
in fact the right measure. In particular, what happens when the negative 
economic impacts of environmental degradation are taken into account? 
As Repetto et al. (1996) note, the effect of environmental regulation on 
productivity must be negative, almost by definition. Most environmental 
regulation in advanced economies has been based on technological standards 
such as ‘best available technology’. Hence any regulation forces firms to 
                                                                                                                                    
9Albrecht (1999) does find some support for the Porter hypothesis in the context of the chlorofluorocarbon 
industry (CFCs). CFCs have been severely regulated via national implementation of the Montreal Protocol. Du 
Pont was an early mover in switching out of CFCs into substitutes and gained market share. Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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purchase abatement technology, which is not productive in the sense of 
contributing to the firm’s output. Hence output must be less than it otherwise 
would have been if the resources used for abatement were allocated to 
productive uses. Costs rise and there is no offsetting increase in output. This 
conclusion need not follow if the measures used to reduce pollution themselves 
contribute to productivity, an issue addressed earlier in the context of the 
reliability of environmental expenditure data.  
Table 5 lists the more recent studies on the links between regulation and 
productivity (the literature goes back to the 1970s). Notably, most of the studies 
again relate to the USA. Most also use a specific dataset on pollution control 
expenditures. As noted earlier, one study, by Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (1997  
 
TABLE 5 
Studies of the Effects of Environmental Regulation on (Conventionally Measured) 
Productivity 
Study  Country  Effect of environmental regulation 
Barbera and McConnell, 
1990 
USA  10–30 per cent of reduced productivity 
growth 1970–80 compared with 1960–70 
due to environmental regulation 
Jorgensen and Wilcoxen, 
1990 
USA  GNP growth lower than would have been 
1973–85, by 0.07 of a percentage point 
due to mandated environmental 
investments and by 0.3 of a percentage 
point due to environmental operating 
costs 














For 1995, each $1 of environmental 
expenditures raises (marginal) cost of 
production by $7–12 
Gray and Shadbegian, 





Each $1 of environmental expenditures 
raises (marginal) cost of production by 





‘Significant negative effect’ 
Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih, 
1997 and 2000 
USA  Each $1 of environmental expenditure 
raises (marginal) cost of production by 
$0.13 (note the contrast with previous 
studies); range is minus $1 to plus $1.25 
Bruvoll, Glomsrod and Vennemo, 
1995 
Norway  Negligible impact on economic growth 
rates (less than 0.1 of a percentage point) Fiscal Studies 
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and 2000), produces markedly different results from the other studies. It suggests 
that each dollar of environmental expenditure raises production costs by only 13 
cents. This may be compared with up to $12 in previous studies. Indeed, the 
Morgenstern et al. (1997) study has a lower limit of –$1, i.e. each dollar of 
expenditure  saves $1 of cost. Morgenstern et al. suggest their result arises 
because the other studies assume that plants are homogeneous, i.e. that the 
effects on productivity will be the same regardless of plant age, location and 
management. Once heterogeneity is assumed, the negative productivity effects 
fall dramatically. 
As far as the Stage 1 question goes, then, the literature seems overwhelmingly 
to support the view that conventional productivity measures are negatively 
affected by environmental expenditures. But this result could be peculiar to the 
USA and could arise from a highly restrictive assumption about the nature of the 
factors affecting productivity at the plant level. 
The next stage asks whether a different configuration of environmental policy 
would have the same negative effects on productivity as might be suggested by 
the conventional literature. In particular, if policy had been driven by market-
based approaches, would the effects have been the same? Surprisingly, little 
analysis seems to have been carried out on this question. This raises the 
possibility that, if there are negative productivity effects, they arise because 
policy has simply been inefficient. The reasons for supposing that market-based 
instruments (MBIs) would produce markedly lower impacts on productivity are 
now well known. First, the flexibility introduced by MBIs means that firms can 
adopt cost-minimising strategies to comply with regulations. Tietenberg (2000) 
suggests that traditional policies range from being 2 to 22 times more expensive 
than MBI-based policies. Even a modest ‘multiplier’ of 2 would have a dramatic 
effect on the analysis of productivity effects. Second, MBIs probably have a 
dynamic effect on abatement technology, markedly reducing its cost due to the 
incentive to avoid taxes or buy tradable permits. Thus abatement technology 
itself would be cheaper under an MBI system.  
A further feature of prevailing policy is that it might not pass a cost–benefit 
test, i.e. it might be inefficient anyway. Hahn (1996) finds that only 18 per cent 
of 92 US regulations pass a cost–benefit test. Only 19 per cent of the US 
Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations pass such a test. Unfortunately, 
there is no comparable information for other countries. But it can be conjectured 
that the result may not be very different. If so, any negative productivity effects 
of environmental regulation may reflect the inefficiency of the way policy is 
implemented, rather than policy per se. 
Even if negative productivity effects are an issue, the final concern is whether 
productivity is being correctly measured. Repetto et al. (1996) measure the 
damages of the environmental impacts arising from economic activity and then 
deduct them from the output measure. Viewed from another standpoint, 
regulation will have environmental benefits which should be added to the Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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conventional productivity measure. Undertaking studies of the US electricity 
industry, pulp and paper industry and farming, Repetto et al. find that 
conventional measures of the change in productivity for the period from 1970 to 
the early 1990s were –0.35 per cent, +0.16 per cent and +2.3 per cent 
respectively. But the revised productivity measures allowing for the benefits of 
environmental improvement are +0.68 per cent, +0.44 per cent and +2.41 per 
cent. For electricity and paper, then, the proper measurement of productivity 
makes a stark difference. There is a general lesson here for the current concern to 
focus on ‘resource productivity’ (i.e. increases in the ratio of output to resource 
inputs). An unduly narrow focus on, say, GDP as the output measure tends to 
miss the central point that the main importance of resource productivity lies in its 
bilateral environmental effects — reducing the rate of use of resources and the 
corresponding reduction in emissions from producing the output.
10 It is these 
effects, valued at the relevant shadow environmental prices, that are likely to 
justify the focus on resource productivity policies. 
VII. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS 
CURVE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURE? 
The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis suggests that there is an 
inverted U-shaped curve for environmental quality when measured against 
income per capita. In economies at the beginning of an economic development 
process, one might expect the resources allocated to environmental conservation 
to be limited. Essentially, environment is sacrificed in the name of economic 
growth or, put another way, natural capital is depleted and substituted by other 
factors of production, especially man-made capital. After a point, however, the 
demand for environmental quality grows and this eventually results in the 
pollution–income curve peaking and then turning down; further increases in per 
capita income are associated with reductions in pollution. There is an extensive 
literature testing for the presence of EKCs. Early analyses suggested strong 
relationships between income and pollution (for example, Grossman and 
Krueger (1995)) but more recent work (for example, Harbaugh, Levinson and 
Wilson (2000)) has questioned the early findings. EKCs appear to be less 
obviously present once attention focuses away from ‘conventional’ pollutants 
towards various natural resources and more ‘modern’ pollutants such as carbon 
dioxide. 
Explanations for the shape of the EKC abound. Generally, the following 
features of the growth process might be expected: 
                                                                                                                                    
10Indeed, the contribution of resource productivity to overall productivity is likely to be small. Growth 
accounting approaches based on generalised production functions would make the contribution dependent on 
(a) the rate of change in resource productivity and (b) the share of natural resources in GDP. For other than 
resource-rich countries, the latter will tend to be small. Fiscal Studies 
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(a)  Rising per capita income will ‘drag through’ more materials and energy 
consumption and hence more waste — environmental quality will, without 
policy action, decline as income grows. 
(b)  A change in the structure of output will, after a point at least, reduce 
impacts per unit GNP. Additionally, pollution-intensive processes may be 
exported from rich to poor countries (Suri and Chapman, 1998) — pollution 
could effectively be ‘exported’. 
(c)  A change in the demand for the environment will, if the environment is 
income-elastic, translate into policy measures. Such policy measures require 
advanced institutions and, in turn, these institutions tend to evolve only in 
richer countries. 
(d)  A change in technology will occur as growth induces capital replacement 
that embodies technologies with lower environmental impact. 
On this analysis, the question is how far (c) and (d) and the benign aspects of 
(b) offset the effects of (a) and the damaging effects of (b). The EKC literature 
does not, in fact, resolve this issue, since most of it contents itself with a 
straightforward link between income and environmental degradation. Only 
limited efforts have been made to ‘decompose’ the relationship in terms of 
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where E is the environmental change variable (emissions, change in land cover 
of forests etc.), Y is GNP, POP is population, t is time, i is location, a, b and c 
are parameters to be estimated and ε  is an error term. The squared term reflects 
the expected shape of the EKC. Note that the first equation has the dependent 
variable as per capita environmental change and the second equation has 
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where (Y/POP)
* is the turning-point of the inverted U, i.e. the point at which 
environmental impact per capita or absolute environmental degradation declines 
with income per capita.
11 
Some authors provide other explanations of inverted U-shaped curves. 
Andreoni and Levinson (2001) show that the EKC can result from a simple 
model in which individual well-being is a positive function of consumption and a 
negative linear function of pollution, and in which pollution is a linear function 
of consumption and a negative function of abatement. The essence of the model 
is that the abatement function has increasing returns to scale. The authors 
suggest that this is typical of abatement expenditures and that their model 
embraces other models, including those that posit ‘political economy’ 
relationships involving various stakeholders in society, some demanding more 
abatement, some demanding less. 
While the competing explanations for the shape of the EKC are interesting, 
implicit in the EKC is the notion that one of the factors producing the downturn 
in the curve, if the curve itself is identifiable, is the rise in the demand for 
environmental goods as income goes beyond the peak. This holds whether the 
explanatory model is a simple evolutionary model of how economies behave 
over time or a political economy model involving interest groups. This suggests 
that the demand for the environment is income-elastic. Due to data limitations — 
namely, the general absence of expenditure data for poorer countries — we 
cannot identify a ‘full’ EKC. But we can investigate the relationship between 
environmental expenditure and income for richer countries. More specifically, 
we can look at the elasticity of expenditure with respect to income. It is 
important to note that the conventional notion of an income elasticity of demand 
relates to private goods, while the relevant notion in the current context is that of 
a quantity-rationed public good. Essentially, public goods are exogenous to 
household and corporate decisions. Hence the relevant income elasticity is what 
has been called in the literature the ‘price flexibility of income’ (Randall and 
Stoll, 1980) or the ‘income elasticity of virtual price’ (Hanemann, 1991), the 
‘income elasticity of willingness to pay’ (Flores and Carson, 1997), the ‘income 
elasticity of environmental value’ and the ‘income elasticity of environmental 
improvement’ (Kristrom and Riera, 1996). Appendix E sets out the basic 
relationships. The main point of relevance is that the elasticity of willingness to 
pay with respect to income is equal to the ratio of the conventional income 
elasticity of demand to the (negative) of the price elasticity of demand. In other 
words, 
                                                                                                                                    
11There is a debate as to the functional form of the EKC. Some authors argue that cubic equations fit rich-
country data better so that the declining section of the inverted U is followed by a further rising section — see, 












where ε is elasticity and the subscripts denote willingness to pay with respect to 
income (W), quantity with respect to income (Y) and quantity with respect to 
price (P).  
There are several views about the expected size of εW. Garrod and Willis 
(1999) argue that short-run price elasticities for environmental goods are less 
than one and income elasticities are positive and often greater than one. The 
latter finding is consistent with the intuition that ‘the environment’ is a luxury 
good (i.e. a normal good with conventional income elasticity greater than unity). 
Hence εW will be significantly greater than one in the short run and, arguably, 
smaller in the long run as price elasticities rise. Flores and Carson (1997) show 
that the size of εW cannot be determined from the size of εY (as is clear from the 
equation above) and offer no empirical support for small or large values. 
Kristrom and Riera (1996) analyse contingent valuation studies of environmental 
change
12 and conclude that εW is less than one, i.e. the ‘consumption’ of 
environmental goods accounts for a higher proportion of income of the poor than 
of the rich. If they are right, then ‘environment’ is a normal good but not a 
luxury good, contradicting the usual intuition about the demand for 
environmental quality. 
We seek to offer some further evidence of relevance to this debate by 
estimating the income elasticity of environmental expenditure using the OECD 
database. To our knowledge, this is the first time that environmental expenditure 
data have been used for this purpose. Magnani (2000) purports to carry out such 
an exercise but has mistakenly used OECD data on environmental research and 
development (R&D) expenditures rather than the aggregate expenditure on 
environmental protection. Even if the data for R&D expenditures were reliable 
(what constitutes R&D expenditure is open to considerable interpretation), these 
expenditures add up to a few tens of millions of dollars in most OECD countries, 
and a few hundred millions in France, the UK, Japan and the USA. In the UK, 
for example, OECD-recorded R&D expenditures are around $180 million, 
compared with total environmental protection expenditures of over $12,000 
million. In other words, Magnani’s analysis relates to expenditures that 
constitute between 1 and 2 per cent of total pollution abatement expenditures 
(and even less if the total relates to environmental protection generally). 
Table 6 summarises the available GDP and public environmental expenditure 
data. The data are derived from two OECD papers (OECD, 1996 and 1999). The 
earlier one contains data from 1972 to 1984, while the later one contains data  
 
                                                                                                                                    
12Contingent valuation studies elicit measures of willingness to pay directly via questionnaires, so that the 
resulting values can be related to socio-economic characteristics of respondents, such as income. Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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TABLE 6 
Data Summary for Environmental Expenditure in OECD Countries 















(% of GDP) 
Australia 6  319.8  1.5  0.5 
Austria 11  120.3  1.2  1.0 
Belgium 3  187.6  0.9  0.5 
Canada 22  454.1  3.5  0.8 
Czech Republic 4  102.2  0.7  0.7 
Denmark 18  90.5  0.6  0.7 
Finland 5  81.4  0.4  0.5 
France 17  920.7  7.0  0.8 
Germany 5  1,395.4  12.6  0.9 
West Germany  10  1,031.3  8.5  0.8 
Greece 7  93.1  0.5  0.5 
Hungary 5  76.5  0.3  0.4 
Iceland 12 4.5  0.0  0.3 
Ireland 3  26.3  0.3  1.0 
Italy 3  337.6  1.9  0.6 
Japan 15  822.3  8.1  1.0 
Korea 6  461.2  3.9  0.8 
Mexico 13  502.4  1.6  0.3 
Netherlands 10  230.7  2.3  1.0 
Norway 1  69.0  0.6  0.8 
Poland 8  197.7  0.8  0.4 
Portugal 7  101.2  0.6  0.6 
Spain 7  474.8  2.5  0.5 
Sweden 3  140.5  1.1  0.7 
Switzerland 12  126.0  1.1  0.9 
UK 4  766.4  5.1  0.7 
USA 23  4,446.8  27.3  0.6 
Sources: OECD, 1996 and 1999. 
 
from 1985 to 1997. To derive the 1972–84 absolute public expenditure figures, 
the absolute expenditure data from OECD (1996), given in 1980 prices, were 
multiplied by a GDP inflator
13 to obtain constant 1991 prices. GDP data in 1991 
prices for this period were derived using public expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP (see Appendix A) and absolute public environmental expenditure in 
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constant 1991 prices. For the period 1985–97, absolute public environmental 
expenditure was derived in the same way as described in Section III to get 
Figures 1a–1c, except that the percentage of GDP for public environmental 
expenditure was used only. GDP data for this period were also obtained from 
OECD (1999) using a GDP index. Thus data from two OECD papers were 
amalgamated, resulting in a cross-sectional time-series (or panel) dataset of 240 
observations covering the period 1972–97, with all data in constant 1991 prices. 
The USA spends by far the most in absolute terms, followed by Germany, 
France and Japan. As a percentage of GDP, the USA is behind a number of 
countries with regards to public environmental expenditure, with Japan, Austria, 
the Netherlands and Ireland spending around 1 per cent of GDP on 
environmental goods. However, this dataset is limited by the large number of 
missing observations over the 1972–97 period, although the inclusion of even 
more limited private expenditure data would increase the number of missing 
observations. In addition, there were problems with amalgamating the two sets of 
OECD data, with some data anomalies occurring in the earlier paper as a result 
of its general unreliability. 
Figure 3 displays the logs of public environmental expenditure against the 
logs of GDP of the panel dataset. As the graph shows, there appears to be a clear  
 
FIGURE 3 
Log of Environmental Expenditure (Public Only) against Log of GDP: 
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relationship between GDP and public environmental expenditure: as GDP 
increases, so does public environmental expenditure. However, this relationship 
does not control for any country-specific effects, i.e. different countries having 
different levels of public environmental expenditure that are independent of time 
and GDP. Furthermore, the plot does not control for any time trend in that there 
may be growing environmental expenditure due to increasing pollution, 
population or environmental awareness over time that may be independent of 
country-specific effects or GDP. 
Using the data from OECD (1996 and 1999), a fixed-effects model,
14 which 
estimates a constant for each country and takes account of missing observations, 
was fitted to test the effects of a change in GDP on changes in absolute public 
environmental expenditure over the period 1972–97: 
  01 it it i it YX ββ νε =+ + + ,  t = 0, 1, 2, …, T (0 = 1972, 1 = 1973, …) 
     i = 1, 2, 3, …, N (1 = Australia, 2 = Austria, …), 
where T = 26 time periods covering 1972 to 1997, N = 27 countries covered by 
the OECD data, Yit denotes public environmental expenditure for country i in 
year t in 1991 prices (US$ billion) and Xit denotes absolute GDP for country i in 
year t in 1991 prices (US$ billion). In this model, νi+εit is the residual. 
Next, a time-trend variable (t) is incorporated into the model to control for 
any increases in environmental expenditure that occur independently of country-
specific effects and GDP, where an observation taken in 1972 is coded as 0, an 
observation in 1975 is coded as 3 and so on. In addition, the data were 
transformed. Natural logs were taken of both absolute public environmental 
expenditure and GDP since a log-log specification is the most readily 
interpretable, although the most general model would be to Box-Cox-transform
15 
both variables.  
This produces the final model: 
  01 2 ln ln it it i it YX t ββ β νε =+ + + + ,  t = 0, 1, 2, …, T (0 = 1972, …) 
      i = 1, 2, 3, …, N (1 = Australia, …). 
The results in Table 7 show that the time-trend variable is not a significant 
determinant of public environmental expenditure, i.e. β2 is not significantly 
different from 0 (p = 0.113 > 0.005). Hence there is no evidence for growth in 
public environmental expenditure over time independent of growth in GDP.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
14This is equivalent to an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with country-specific dummies. 
15Box-Cox transformations were attempted (results available from the authors on request) and showed that the 
log-log transformation was favoured to the linear model, semi-log model or reciprocal model. Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 7 
Results from the Regression Analysis 
  Coefficient  Standard error  t statistic  p>|t| 
ln GDP  1.194958  0.0655344  18.234  0.000 
Time trend  –0.008117  0.0050999  –1.592  0.113 
Constant –6.048623  0.3343025  –18.093  0.000 
Notes:  Number of observations = 240 
  R-squared = 0.6693 
  Country-specific constants are available from the authors on request. 
 
GDP
16 is a very significant determinant of public environmental expenditure, i.e. 
β1 is significantly different from both 0 and 1 (p < 0.05). The coefficient of GDP 
is greater than 1 and is also statistically significantly greater than 1. The results 
of this log-log model, where the coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity, 
appear to show that the income elasticity of willingness to pay for the 
environment is just higher than unity, i.e. a 1 per cent increase in GDP leads to 
an average 1.2 per cent increase in public environmental expenditure. Finally, 
the R-squared from this model is relatively high, with around two-thirds of the 
variation in environmental expenditure being explained by the model. 
VIII. WHAT DETERMINES ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURE? 
The links between environmental expenditure and GDP are clearly very strong. 
However, a more general theory of what explains environmental expenditures 
has, to date, been missing. The link to income could be interpreted in two ways. 
First, as incomes grow, the demand for environmental quality grows, as 
predicted in most versions of the EKC hypothesis. The evidence in the previous 
section can be interpreted as suggesting that the income elasticity of willingness 
to pay is just above unity. 
Second, higher incomes are associated with a higher ability to pay and, once 
the EKC ‘peak’ has been achieved, countries begin to devote more of their 
resources to environmental protection in order to ‘undo’ past damage as the 
nation climbs up the upwards portion of the EKC. On this view, high 
expenditures reflect high (cumulative) damage. To some extent, the contrast 
between these two positions is artificial in that any decision to spend more 
resources on environmental protection must still reflect a shift in social 
preferences. Such preference shifts could come about because of greater 
                                                                                                                                    
16We recognise that GDP per capita is a better indicator of wealth than absolute GDP and ran a similar model, 
regressing GDP per capita on public environmental expenditure per capita. The results are almost the same (i.e. 
the coefficient of GDP per head is equal to 1.2, and significantly different from 0 and 1), which is due to 
OECD countries all being relatively similar to one another. The result would almost certainly differ if 
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awareness of environmental problems after the early stages of growth. In other 
words, preference shifts precisely because what were largely invisible problems 
become visible as the assimilative capacity of natural environments begins to be 
exhausted. Casual empiricism does not support this view, however, since 
environmental problems in poor countries are more than visible and there is a 
high potential demand for their solution — for example, safe water supply, 
sanitation and soil quality. Overall, then, we prefer to see the expenditure–
income link as reflecting a more general change in social preferences as income 
rises. We therefore surmise that εW <1 in poor countries. 
If our hypothesis is correct, environmental expenditures reflect underlying 
social concerns about the environment, concerns that grow with income. As 
such, we would expect to see expenditures being correlated with some indicator 
or indicators of environmental concern. In turn, environmental concern may 
reflect other socio-economic influences such as education. Linking expenditures 
to some measures of social concern suggests analysing the issue in terms of a 
‘political economy’ model of policy outcomes. Political economy models seek to 
explain policy outcomes in terms of the political forces that generate a political-
economic equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in which the amount of a public good 
is determined by governments facing differing demands from various 
stakeholders. The models are rooted in the early literature on public choice (for 
example, Buchanan and Tullock (1975)) and bargaining solutions along the lines 
of the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960). While Aidt (1998) characterises the 
governmental implementation of policy as a Pigouvian feature of the models, in 
fact most environmental policy does not proceed along Pigouvian lines 
(essentially, environmental taxes) but through standard-setting.  
In the current case, environmental expenditures would be the outcome of 
policy decisions made by government. Those decisions are, in turn, the outcome 
of some political compromise between the amount of environmental quality that 
households and corporations are willing to supply (through their taxes and 
forgone income) and what lobby groups, including the government itself, 
demand. Several attempts have been made to explain environmental preferences 
and to develop political economy models of environmental policy (Black, Guppy 
and Urmetzer, 1997; Aidt, 1998; Marsiliani and Renström, 2000). One 
significant feature of some of these models is the inclusion of income 
distribution as an explanatory variable (Magnani, 2000; Marsiliani and 
Renström, 2000). The essential argument here is that poorer individuals will 
have a lower preference for environmental goods relative to private goods and 
that the poor’s demand for redistribution of income will lower production due to 
production inefficiencies.
17 Evidence that the poor care less about the 
                                                                                                                                    
17This second element of the argument is contentious, however, since lower production means lower throughput 
of materials and energy via the materials balance principle. This production effect appears to be ignored in the 
Marsiliani–Renström paper, for instance.  Fiscal Studies 
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environment than the rich is, however, not strong — see, among others, Jones 
and Dunlap (1992). For the USA, Elliott, Seldon and Regens (1997) find that 
public support for environmental spending varies positively with education, 
gender, the degree to which the individual is ‘urbanised’, ‘liberalism’ of the 
individual’s viewpoint, and race (non-whites expressing more support). They 
also find that income is significant but less so than the previous factors. Age 
influences spending support negatively, i.e. older people show less support for 
environmental spending.  
Cross-country analysis obviously has to focus on fewer explanatory variables, 
since such things as age and gender will not vary substantially across countries. 
In what follows, we take the OECD data previously described and use 
environmental expenditure as a percentage of GDP as the dependent variable. 
The assumption here is that actual expenditures reflect the political-economic 
outcome of the various forces in the economy demanding different levels of   
 
TABLE 8 
Determinants of Environmental Expenditure 
  Public 
environmental 
expenditure 












Belgium  0.4  1995  25.0  1997 34 1988  18,359 
Denmark  0.5  1988  24.7  1992 45 1988  20,421 
Finland  0.6  1994  25.6  1991 39 1989  15,501 
France  0.8  1988  32.7  1995 36 1988  17,207 
Germany  0.8  1988  30.0  1994 45 1988  18,993 
Greece 0.5  1990  32.7  1993 53 1988  9,941 
Italy  0.6  1988  27.3  1995 62 1988  16,519 
Japan  0.9  1990  24.9  1993 41 1990  18,497 
Netherlands  0.9  1988  32.6  1994 54 1988  15,707 
Portugal  0.4  1988  35.6  1994 41 1988  9,229 
Spain  0.6  1988  32.5  1990 52 1988  12,669 
UK  0.4  1990  36.1  1991 32 1988  16,184 
USA  0.6  1990  40.8  1997 58 1990  23,892 
aThe higher this is, the greater the income inequality between the poorest and richest within a single country. 
bThis is given as the average percentage of persons ‘very concerned’ with regards to national environmental 
problems: accidental damage to the marine environment, industrial waste disposal, water pollution and air 
pollution. 
cGDP per capita and environmental expenditure are given for the same year. 
Sources: OECD, 1991 and 1999; World Bank, 2001. Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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environmental protection.
18 The independent variables are GDP per capita, an 
index of income inequality (the Gini index) and the strength of public opinion on 
environmental problems. These data are given in Table 8.  
The data for this cross-country analysis are fully available for only 13 
countries. Furthermore, while the index for income inequality for a particular 
country changes very little from one year to the next, changes in public concern 
for the environment are not so well known. Hence this analysis uses public 
opinion data collected between 1988 and 1990,
19 while some environmental 
expenditure data only become available in the mid-1990s — for example, for 
Belgium and Finland. Therefore, given the obvious data limitations where not all 
the data are collected for the same year, any conclusions drawn from this 
analysis should be treated with caution. 
Consider the following model: 
  0 1 12 233 ln ii i i i YX X X ββ β β ε =+ + + + ,   i = 1, 2, …, N, 
where  N = 13 countries, Yi denotes public environmental expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP, X1i denotes income inequality for country i,  X2i denotes 
public opinion for country i and X3i denotes GDP per capita (US$, 1991 prices) 
for country i. The results from this regression model are shown in Table 9. 
For each independent variable, we test the null hypothesis that each variable 
has no effect on environmental expenditure and find that each coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. Therefore the results from this limited 
regression analysis provide little evidence that income inequality, public concern  
 
TABLE 9 
Results from the Regression Analysis 
  Coefficient  Standard error  t statistic  p>|t| 
Income inequality  –0.005079 0.01169  –0.4345  0.6741 
Public opinion  0.004844  0.007057  0.6865  0.5097 
ln (GDP per capita)  0.1875  0.21148  0.8865  0.3984 
Constant –1.271  2.1151  –0.6008  0.5628 
Notes:  Number of observations = 13 
  R-squared = 0.1548 
                                                                                                                                    
18Marsiliani and Renström (2000) adopt CO2 per unit GDP as a proxy for the degree of environmental 
protection. However, environmental policy has only recently begun to address the issue of greenhouse gas 
emissions and, in most cases, only modestly. Carbon intensity is far more likely to reflect fossil-fuel 
endowments, energy prices and the state of technology and hence would appear to be a rather poor proxy for 
environmental protection. 
19A more up-to-date survey of European public attitudes to the environment can be found in a report by the 
European Commission (1999), although it contains very little detailed data at a country level and instead 
focuses on European aggregates. Fiscal Studies 
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for the environment or GDP per head has an effect on public environmental 
expenditure (as a proportion of GDP). Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the 
model has a very small sample and the results cannot be afforded firm 
credibility. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
Perhaps the overriding conclusion we would draw is that the data on 
environmental expenditure outside the USA, and probably Norway, are so poor 
that it is very much open to question whether econometric exercises are currently 
worthwhile. From a policy standpoint, this conclusion is somewhat startling. 
While there are several exercises in the USA whereby some idea can be obtained 
about the relative costs and benefits of environmental regulation generally 
(Freeman, 1982, 1990 and 2000; Hahn, 1996; Portney, 1990 and 2000), there are 
no such exercises outside the USA, nor do we see how they could take place. 
Ironically, while most of the controversy in cost–benefit procedures applied to 
the environment takes place in the context of the valuation of benefits, it turns 
out that we have little real idea of the budgetary costs of environmental 
protection, let alone the wide general equilibrium costs. In an era of renewed 
attention to efficiency in government, this finding is disturbing. 
Despite the limitations of the data, we set out to see what the limited data 
could tell us about three questions:  
•  whether there has been a shift in the relative burdens of environmental 
expenditure borne by the state (national and local government) and the 
private sector (corporations and households);  
•  whether environmental expenditure acts as a ‘drag’ on economic growth; and  
•  how environmental expenditure might vary as economic development occurs 
and, a related issue, what determines environmental expenditure. 
1. Inspecting the Data 
Before addressing the three questions directly, we asked how reliable the data 
were. No tests of reliability have been carried out outside the USA, where the 
‘raw’ data are far more detailed. Somewhat oddly, the assessments of reliability 
of US data provide contradictory results, several studies suggesting substantial 
understatements of true cost and one recent study suggesting significant 
overstatement of costs! 
Inspection of the raw OECD data (Figures 2a–2c) suggests that, in per capita 
terms and for private and public expenditures combined, countries might be 
‘banded’ as follows: Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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Per capita expenditure 
Above $300  Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland, USA 
$200–299  Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, 
Sweden 
$100–199  Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Korea, UK 
<$100  Greece, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Spain 
By and large, the banding is as one would expect but for the Czech Republic. 
Also, Korea appears to be highly placed. Inspection of the data shows that Korea 
significantly increased its expenditures in only six years, whilst the Czech 
Republic has more than doubled its per capita expenditure in the same period. 
The Netherlands, France and Sweden show substantial increases since the mid-
1980s, and Poland has shown a big increase during the 1990s. 
We turn now to the three questions. 
2. The Public/Private Split in Environmental Expenditure 
We hypothesised that we would expect to see a rise in the relative burden of 
expenditure being borne by the private sector because of (a) increased private 
spending due to regulation based on standard-setting, (b) growth of fiscal 
ideologies favouring the reduction in public spending generally and (c), related 
to (b), increased privatisation. Taking the OECD data at face value, Table 4 
suggested that there has been no such rise in the share of expenditure borne by 
the private sector. The general trends are either fairly constant or slightly 
declining. There are no obvious reasons for these trends. Coverage of the data 
varies by country, but this should not affect time trends for single countries. It is 
possible that coverage of individual country data varies with time as data 
collection changes (we hesitate to say it improves), but the detail in the original 
sources is not sufficient to judge. At best, then, we can say that the available data 
do not show the expected shift towards an increasing private sector burden. 
3. Environmental Drag 
An important question concerns the role that increasing environmental 
expenditures have in economic growth. This has been addressed in a fairly large 
literature, although much of it is centred on the USA, historically arising because 
of the concern there to explain periods of low overall factor productivity growth. 
Cross-country generalisations may therefore be difficult. Various forms of the 
‘drag’ hypothesis can be identified: the first concerns the export performance of 
environmentally heavily regulated industries relative to less regulated ones; the 
second concerns the notion that firms move out of national jurisdictions because 
of environmental regulation; the third suggests that inward investment will be 
less in heavily regulating countries; and the fourth concerns the impact of 
regulation on productivity. For all of the effects other than the impact on Fiscal Studies 
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productivity, the literature finds little or no support for the drag hypothesis. This 
finding is consistent regardless of the methodologies used to identify impacts, 
ranging from case studies through to general equilibrium models. For those who 
espouse environmental concerns, this finding is important since the ‘threat’ that 
competitiveness and employment will suffer because of additional regulation is 
widely used by industry to lobby against regulations. Moreover, the regulations 
in question are dominated by traditional command-and-control measures. If 
environmental economists are right in arguing that market-based approaches are 
less costly, we would expect the drag hypothesis to be weakened even further. 
The productivity literature is generally confined to the USA and nearly all of 
the studies find a negative effect of regulation on productivity. At one extreme, 
however, one study raises the possibility of positive impacts and, at the other, the 
negative impacts are said to be significantly negative (Table 5). However, the 
extent to which this literature should be used to cast doubt on the wisdom of 
regulatory policies is open to question. First, for the periods in which the studies 
were carried out, the USA was heavily reliant upon command-and-control 
measures. A market-based approach might not show the same productivity 
effects due to (a) initially lower compliance costs and (b) dynamic effects of 
inducing technological change. Second, the productivity literature adopts a 
highly partial view of the effects of environmental policies. By focusing on 
measured outputs, non-market effects are ignored entirely. This neglect has two 
effects. First, the beneficial effects of environmental policy on human well-being 
are not allowed to offset any of the negative output effects that are identified. 
The correct numeraire is not output but a welfare-adjusted measure of output 
such as output minus externalities. As the study by Repetto et al. (1996) shows, 
this can have a dramatic effect on the results. Second, it is unclear if the 
approaches account for any of the indirect but positive effects of environmental 
policy on output. One obvious link is from reduced pollution to improved human 
health and from health improvements to productivity impacts. Available but very 
limited evidence suggests that this indirect linkage could be important.  
Overall, then, we doubt if the ‘productivity’ literature has significant 
implications for environmental policy, at least outside the USA and, we suspect, 
within the USA also. Nonetheless, it is important to keep such studies under 
review and to ensure that non-US experience is expanded by research in this 
area. A related issue concerns the potential contrast between the ‘no effects’ 
finding of the competitiveness literature and the ‘negative effects’ finding of 
most of the productivity literature since, a priori, one would expect these 
findings to be consistent.  
We also investigated the view that, far from having negative impacts on 
economic growth, environmental policy might actually increase growth or, at 
least, increase competitiveness. This ‘win–win’ view is primarily associated with 
Michael Porter. It has strong similarities with the corporate environmental 
literature that argues that environmentally and socially responsible corporations Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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are likely to fare better financially than those that neglect these social 
dimensions. But the Porter hypothesis has proved to be difficult to verify. 
Reassessments of the industries Porter claims do support the hypothesis have not 
been able to reproduce his results. We surmise that win–win arguments are likely 
to attract a degree of public and political attention out of proportion to the 
likelihood that they are correct. Win–win solutions avoid the necessity of facing 
up to real-world trade-offs. We do not reject the idea of win–win possibilities out 
of hand: few decision-makers are completely informed and few are completely 
economically rational. But for the Porter hypothesis to be right, bounded 
rationality and incomplete information must be pervasive, and we doubt if that is 
the case.  
4. Environmental Expenditure and Economic Development 
A large literature has developed that argues that the process of economic 
development will at first worsen environmental quality and then improve it. 
There is, it is argued, an inverted U-shaped curve linking environmental 
degradation to income per capita. How far these ‘environmental Kuznets curves’ 
actually prevail is open to question. Rather like the win–win hypothesis, the 
early literature was seized upon as supporting the notion that ‘natural progress’ 
will guarantee environmental sustainability. In practice, more and more 
empirical research is casting doubt on the robustness of the early findings. 
Nonetheless, if we take a crude indicator such as the ratio of primary energy use 
to GDP, it is well known that this exhibits a time trend of an inverted U-shaped 
curve. Energy per unit GDP rises at first and then declines. Structural economic 
change, changing energy mixes and technological change that improves energy 
efficiency all account for the change in the relationship. But it is also suggested 
that higher incomes induce a demand for environmental quality, a demand that 
should translate into increased environmental expenditure. To play a significant 
role, we would expect this linkage to show up in a high income elasticity of 
demand for the environment. As noted in the main text, what can actually be 
measured is the income elasticity of willingness to pay or expenditure, not 
income elasticities of demand in the conventional sense. Appendix E shows the 
relationship between the two elasticities. We therefore investigate the elasticity 
of expenditure with respect to income using the available OECD data. These 
suggest an elasticity of 1.2, which is perhaps less than we would have expected if 
the ‘environmental demand effect’ is to play a significant role in explaining the 
downward slope of the environmental Kuznets curve. 
Finally, we made an attempt to ‘explain’ environmental expenditure in terms 
of a political economy model. We regressed environmental expenditure as a 
percentage share of GDP on a measure of inequality, GDP itself and public 
opinion. We found no statistically significant relationship but accept that the 
sample is probably too small to detect true relationships. Fiscal Studies 
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APPENDIX A 
OECD ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES 
Tables A.1 and A.2 set out the available OECD data for environmental 
expenditure in OECD countries, both private and public, as a percentage of each 
country’s GDP. At best, the data are spotty, particularly those derived from 
OECD (1989). For each table, the data for 1972 up until 1984 originate from 
OECD (1989), while the data from 1985 to 1997 originate from OECD (1999). 
Data for public expenditures are better than those for total expenditures since 
private expenditures — i.e. what corporations and households spend — are often 
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APPENDIX B 
EUROPEAN UNION ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES 
European Union data on environmental expenditures are poor. This appendix 
assembles the available data.  
Table B.1 shows early estimates of French expenditures. These are assumed 
to be a combination of government and industrial expenditures, and they also 
cover capital and operating costs. 
TABLE B.1 
French Environmental Expenditures 
Billion
a ecus, 1983 prices 
1967  1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
5.9  6.4 6.9 6.8 7.0 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.7 
1976  1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983   
9.4  9.4 9.5 9.8  10.0  9.7 9.7 9.6   
aBillion = 10
9. 
Source: French Ministry of the Environment, 1984. 
TABLE B.2 
EU-Wide Expenditures: Government and Industry
a 
Million ecus, current prices 
  1978 1980 1988 1992 
Austria  Not member  Not member  Not member  Not member 
Belgium 290      1,200
b 
Denmark  435   1,000 1,200 
Finland  Not member  Not member  Not member  Not member 
France 2,970    8,300  12,900 
Germany 7,854   16,500 20,500 
Greece  107    300 
Ireland  90   300 300 
Italy     5,700 6,800 
Luxembourg       See  Belgium 
Netherlands    1,412 2,700 3,500 
Portugal  20   300 300 
Spain  >175   1,800 3,900 
Sweden  Not member  Not member  Not member  Not member 
UK 3,608    2,000  12,400 
EU total    45,300
c 56,800
c 63,300 
aAssume it is both. 1992 = ERECO (1993) figures are definitely both; note that these estimates do not agree 
with the EUROSTAT (1999) figures — see below. 
bIncludes Luxembourg. 
c1992 prices. 
Sources: 1978 and 1980 — SEMA-METRA (1986); 1988 — European Commission (1992) based on ERECO 
(1993); 1992 — ERECO (1993). Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
447 
TABLE B.3 
EU Total Environmental Expenditures: Government and Industry 
Million ecus, 1992 prices 
1980  1981 1982 1983 1984    1985 1986 
45,314  45,240 45,340 45,641 45,948 49,105 52,285 
1987  1988 1989 1990 1991  1992  
54,458  56,831 59,150 61,618 62,544 63,340   
Notes: Relates to EU before the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in January 1995. Unfortunately, the 
sources offer no country breakdown of the ERECO totals. 
Source: ERECO, 1993. 
 
TABLE B.4 
EU Total Environmental Expenditures: Government and Industry 
Billion
a Euros, current prices 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 
Austria     3.0   
Finland     0.8   
France   6.7  7.7   
Germany  13.5 15.6 19.4 18.7 
Netherlands       5.0 
Portugal    0.6  0.6 
Spain   2.9     
EU  total  53.2 56.2 64.6 65.5 
aBillion = 10
9. 
Source: EUROSTAT, 1999. 
 
TABLE B.5 
EU Total Environmental Expenditures Per Capita: Government and Industry 
Euros, current prices 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 
Austria     373   
Finland     149   
France   116  133   
Germany  168 192 239 229 
Netherlands       322 
Portugal     58 63 
Spain    73   
EU  total  137 150 170 186 
Source: EUROSTAT, 1999. 
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Tables B.2 and B.3 report on early estimates of EU-wide expenditure.  
Table B.4 gives data in current prices, based on EUROSTAT (1999). Note 
that the cell figures are the only independent figures, i.e. based on country 
returns. The EU totals are artefacts based on EUROSTAT’s assumption that 
expenditures vary directly with GNP. 
Table B.5 repeats Table B.4 but in per capita terms. Again, note that the cell 
figures are the only independent figures and that the EU totals are artefacts, as in 
Table B.4. 
Table B.6 provides estimates of government expenditure only. These are not 
summarised in EUROSTAT (1999) and have therefore been taken from the 
country tables. 
Table B.7 shows EUROSTAT’s estimates of industry expenditure, again 
taken from country tables. 
TABLE B.6 
EU Environmental Expenditures: Government Only 
Million Euros, current prices 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Austria         1,745   
Denmark  282 248 279 339 372 393 432 507 509 
Finland         420   
France      3,702 4,070 4,579 5,184 6,082 6,574   
Germany    4,518 4,413 4,788 5,441 6,694 8,457 8,938 9,672 
Netherlands       2,642   3,215  
Portugal    94 171 159 189 213 255 264   
Spain  1,399 1,662 1,994 1,376 1,719 1,795       
Sweden      1,300      
Source: EUROSTAT, 1999. 
 
TABLE B.7 
EU Environmental Expenditures: Industry Only 
Million Euros, current prices 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 
Austria    1,240   
Finland 506  457  396   
Netherlands     1,825 1,573 
Portugal     109 109 
Spain    1,210   
EU total    3,009    
Source: EUROSTAT, 1999. 
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APPENDIX C 
UK ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES 
The earliest estimates of environmental expenditures for the UK relate to 1977. 
Table C.1 shows these estimates as recorded in ECOTEC (1989), together with 
conversion to 1991 prices. Once converted to a single base year, considerable 
fluctuations in total expenditure are observed and it seems likely that the very 
early estimates for 1977 are substantial exaggerations. The figures for 1977–85 
are, in any event, only the broadest of guesses and were not supported by survey 
methods. The 1988 figures are the first to be supported by a more detailed survey 
of industrial costs. 
More recent estimates are given in Table C.2. 
Table C.3 shows the breakdown of industrial abatement costs for 1997, the 
year for which the most detailed study exists. The table shows that chemicals,  
 
TABLE C.1 
Environmental Expenditures in the UK: Pollution Control Only 
£ million 










Public  1,193    2,380  1,511–1,940 
Private 1,216    2,070  1,860–2,289 




7,158 4,884–5,624 4,440  6,853  5,130 
a1991/1977 price multiplier = 2.97; 1991/1984 price multiplier = 1.48; 1991/1985 price multiplier = 1.54; 
1991/1986 price multiplier = 1.35. Price ratios from World Bank (annual). 
Source: Adapted from ECOTEC (1989). 
 
TABLE C.2 
Environmental Expenditures in the UK 
£ million, 1991 prices 
  1988, 
pollution control only 
1990, 
pollution control only 
1994 1997 
Public 2,042–2,619    1,510   
Private 2,511–3,090
a  2,766  3,592
a 
Households     2,539   
Total 4,553–5,709  4,190–4,793  6,815   
a‘Private’ includes households. Most sources remain silent on the treatment of households. 
Sources: 1988 — adapted from ECOTEC (1989) and converted to 1991 prices; 1990 — broad judgement of 
ERL (1991); 1994 — from ECOTEC (1996) with adjustments for arithmetic errors in the original (Brown 
(1998) also discusses the 1994 survey); 1997 — from ECOTEC (1999). 
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TABLE C.3 
UK Industrial Abatement Costs by Industry, 1997 
Industry Expenditure 
(£ million, 1997 prices) 
Expenditure 
(% of total industrial) 
Mining and quarrying  70  1.6 
Food 560  13.1 
Textiles and leather  130  3.0 
Wood and wood products  110  2.6 
Pulp and paper  350  8.2 
Solid and nuclear fuels and oil refining  170  4.0 
Chemicals 1,040  24.4 
Rubber and plastics  140  3.3 
Other non-metallic products  290  6.8 
Metals 600  14.1 
Machinery and equipment  100  2.3 
Electrical equipment  100  2.3 
Transport equipment  150  3.5 
Other manufacturing  70  1.6 
Energy and water supply  400  9.4 
Total 4,270  100.0 
Source: UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions as recorded in Office for National 
Statistics, United Kingdom National Accounts: The Blue Book, 1999 Edition, The Stationery Office, London, 
Table 12.7. 
 
metals, food and the energy and water utilities account for around 60 per cent of 
all pollution abatement costs in the industrial sector. 
As noted in the text, pollution abatement costs are only part of total 
environmental expenditures. Only one attempt appears to have been made in the 
UK to estimate overall expenditures (UK Department of the Environment, 
1992); the results are recorded in Table C.4. The estimate for pollution control 
expenditure in the corporate sector again reveals the formidable problems of 
attaching statistical significance to the estimates. Table C.4 suggests that 
corporate costs were some £5.9 billion in 1990–91 (at 1991 prices). This might 
be regarded as being broadly comparable to the £5.1 billion (at 1991 prices) for 
1988 shown in Table C.1. But Table C.2 produces results that are significantly 
lower for 1990. 
Table C.4 suggests that total pollution abatement costs from all sectors 
constitute about 60 per cent of all environmental expenditures. Conservation 
expenditures account for around 3 per cent of total environmental expenditures 
and include monies spent on conserving various protected areas and 
environmental improvements. R&D accounts for under 2 per cent of total 
expenditure, but the recorded sums do not include expenditure on ‘clean   
 Public and Private Spending for Environmental Protection 
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TABLE C.4 
Total Environmental Expenditures in the UK, 1990–91 
£ million, 1991 prices 




Pollution abatement  2,200  5,900  680  —  8,780 
Environmental 
conservation 
290 —  —  160  450 
R&D 250  —  —  —  250 
Education and 
training 
90 60  —  —  150 
Sub-total 2,830  5,960  680  160  9,630 
Management of 
natural resources 
630 2,800  —  —  3,430 
Amenity 
improvement 
1,200 —  —  —  1,200 
Total 4,660  8,760  680  160  14,260 
Per cent  33  61  5  1  100 
Source: Brown, 1998. 
 
technology’ and hence R&D expenditures are understated. Education and 
training relates mainly to expenditures on university courses in environmental 
sciences. Management of natural resources constitutes a significant portion of 
expenditure — around 25 per cent — and includes water company expenditures, 
flood defences and fisheries management; energy conservation is excluded. 
Finally, amenity improvement covers activities such as road cleaning and local 
park maintenance. Total expenditures of £14 billion in 1990 would have been 
some 2.5 per cent of UK GDP. 
APPENDIX D 
ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Little is known about environmental expenditure in developing countries. The 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have sponsored studies of 
expenditure in Malaysia and Indonesia (personal communication with J. Vincent, 
2001) but neither study appears to be publicly available. Hansen (1994) reports 
estimates produced by Phantumvanit and Panayotou (1990) for selected 
countries, as shown in Table D.1. Coverage of the data is unclear but the figures 
do suggest expenditures well below 1 per cent of GDP for poorer countries. Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE D.1 
Environmental Expenditures in Selected Developing Countries, 1987 
  As % of GDP  Per capita 
(US$) 
Singapore 1.09  107 
Republic of Korea  0.40  11 
Thailand 0.24  2 
China 0.70  2 
Indonesia 0.38 1.7 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
APPENDIX E 
THE ‘INCOME ELASTICITY’ OF DEMAND FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY 
For a given demand function of the form 
  qp y α βγ =+ + , 
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